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1 Introduction 
1.1 Requirements for frameworks 
"A Rosetta Stone for Nature's Benefits to People".  This is at once the title of one of two papers 
describing the "conceptual framework" adopted by the Intergovernmental Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) and the bold claim for this framework.   Indeed, the 
IPBES is very focused on the utility of nature to people ("benefits to people") and much of their 
framework interprets this utility in an even more narrowly econometric way ("ecosystem 
services" and "sustainable development").   This narrow focus is reflected in the IPBES charter, 
recited with minor variation in both papers (Díaz et al. 2015a, 1; Díaz et al. 2015b, 3) as:  
"strengthening the science-policy interface for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services, long-term human well-being and sustainable development." 
However at times, the authors seek to dispel the impression of a relatively narrow focus and 
make statements that suggest an aspiration to something even more bold – an all-encompassing 
"Rosetta Stone" for the value of nature (not merely its "benefits to people" and "ecosystem 
services"), the value of a life for all people, and all other ideas about value that its authors have a 
name for.  In short, the IPBES at times appears to aspire to present a quite general framework or 
theory of value.1 
The "Rosetta Stone", of course, has come to mean, "a key to some previously undecipherable 
                                                     
1 It is difficult to take these aspirations seriously because these gestures, towards some ecumenical view of 
value, are themselves embedded in, and even couched in terms of, a steadfastly utilitarian view.  This is 
discussed later in the main text. 
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mystery or unattainable understanding".2  The IPBES framework, in contrast, does much to create 
mysteries of its own and little to decipher existing ones.  To understand why the IPBES effort 
obfuscates more than it illuminates requires understanding standards that we should expect any 
conceptual framework to meet.  These standards minimally include a certain coherence of the 
concepts and propositions that serve as its framing presuppositions.  As well as being coherent, 
the framing presuppositions should pass tests of non-contradiction, credibility, and adequacy for 
their framing purpose. 
1.2 Normative frameworks 
Alongside these minimal general standards, we should expect the IPBES framework to meet 
requirements for the specific kind of conceptual framework that it is.  For that, we must be clear 
about what kind of framework it is.  One would be mistaken to think that it is a scientific 
framework, even though the scientific credentials of many of its authors might lead one to 
suppose this.  Rather, the IPBES framework is a normative framework because it purports to 
structure values or norms.  The word "norm" in this context has the prescriptive sense, which 
concerns questions of the ways in which things may be good (or bad) and what this entails for 
how people ought to act with regard to these things.  This prescriptive sense of "norm" has no 
fixed relationship to the descriptive sense in which it means, "what is typical, usual, or standard in 
actual practice".3  Actual standard practice or the norms for some society cannot (merely on 
account of this descriptive fact) be regarded as the key to right behavior.  One can readily see this 
by reference to the standard practice – the norm in many societies over the course of millennia – 
of holding slaves.  This fact did not make holding slaves right. 
The IPBES framework is supposed to frame thinking about the goodness of nature and the 
                                                     
2 The actual Rosetta Stone is a fragment of a granodiorite stele, now encased in the British Museum.  
Egyptian priests inscribed the stele in 196 BCE with a decree on behalf of the teenage King Ptolemy V.  It 
features three different language versions of essentially a single text.  The juxtaposition of the hieroglyphic 
version alongside the ancient Greek and demotic suggested a general key for deciphering Egyptian 
hieroglyphs, knowledge of which evaporated along with its priestly repository when the Roman Emperor 
Theodosius I ordered the Egyptian temples closed in 394 CE. 
3 Norms in the descriptive sense are subject matter in the domains of psychology, sociology, and 
anthropology.  On the other hand, norms in the prescriptive sense are the subject matter of central concern 
in the domain of moral (and more broadly, normative) philosophy.  §2 further discusses this crucial point. 
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rightness of actions to conserve it.  As a consequence, it must be assessed for credibility, and 
adequacy as a normative, rather than as a scientific, framework. 
The difference between normative (prescriptive) truths and scientific ones is crucial:  Finding 
these very different kinds of truths requires very different kinds of investigation and 
investigative acumen.  Unfortunately, this fact is often overlooked, particularly by scientists who 
presume that their scientific expertise extends to expertise in questions of good and bad, right 
and wrong.  Although some extraordinary physicists very vocally lobbied for the Manhattan 
Project, their scientific acumen afforded them no special authority for judging the rightness of 
developing a weapon that they knew would inflict death and unspeakably horrible injuries to 
huge numbers of persons in a single deployment.  Indeed, their eagerness to pursue the science 
connected with this project might well have seriously biased their judgment about its rightness.  
In a similar way, some exceptional ecologists who tease apart the myriad complexities involved 
in ecosystem processes and properties are very vocal in lobbying for certain ways of assessing the 
goodness of nature and the rightness of undertaking projects to alter or manage it.  But like the 
physicists who plumped for the Manhattan Project, they have no special authority to do so, and 
their scientific interests might well bias their normative judgments. 
1.3 Goodness, virtue, and right action 
A Rosetta Stone for value in general would be an accomplishment at least equal to the 
contributions of Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, Mill, and a handful of other formidable thinkers who 
devoted a great part of their life to understanding goodness, virtue, and right action in some 
general way.  A "Rosetta Stone" for value would place the scientists who form the core of IPBES4 
on the level of these greatest thinkers of all time in the normative domain.  Indeed, the authors so 
highly regard their "Rosetta Stone" that they presume it to be the key to solving problems, not 
only involving the determination of the goodness of all things, but of how to institute 
international governance – a problem that for not just centuries but for millennia has defied 
solution by the world's great thinkers in the field of international institutions and law.  For good 
measure, the authors don't fail to mention (Díaz et al. 2015b, 6) "justice, freedom, and equality". 
                                                     
4 The four authors who portray the IPBES conceptual framework as a Rosetta Stone for values – Sandra 
Diaz, Sebsebe Demissew, W. Mark Lonsdale, and Anne Larigauderie – are all biologists. 
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Now we should take care to allow that lack of formally inculcated expertise in some domain does 
not preclude arriving at great insights within it.  With almost no formal training in pure 
mathematics, Srinivasa Ramanujan made extraordinary contributions to mathematical analysis, 
number theory, infinite series, and continued fractions.  And Mary Anning, whose formal 
education did not extend beyond basic reading and writing, made extraordinary contributions to 
the paleontology of ichthyosaurs, plesiosaurs, and belemnites.  The authors of the IPBES 
framework, in contrast, make one normative misstep after another. 
1.4 Sustainable development 
The IPBES scientists don the mantel of normative expertise when they identify and pronounce 
others "expert" in this domain.  Most salient among these IPBES-appointed normative "experts" 
are economists who furnish and promote the view of nature's value as service provider in the 
human economy – the view that dominates the IPBES framework.  This econometric view of 
nature is strongly reinforced by the choice of the IPBES to coordinate their project with WBCSD 
(the World Business Council on Sustainable Development), a band of some of the world's largest 
and most powerful corporations.  Taking note of this liaison is important understanding the aims 
of the IPBES.  For one thing, the "Sustainable Development" in the name of he WBCSD lends 
insight into how we should interpret the IPBES charter (quoted at the start of this paper), which 
borrows this phrase. 
 Unsurprisingly, coterie of WBCSD corporations forthrightly declaims the promise of taking 
nature into account as a capital good like any other – whether or not this treatment preserves or 
destroys an ecosystem – as a means to greater profits.  WBCSD members can endorse this 
accounting program without reservation, not excepting the substantial contingent that may be 
reckoned among the planet's preeminent abusers of the environment and human rights.  This 
contingent includes Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Chevron Corporation, Suncor Energy (unremitting 
purveyors of climate-changing fossil fuels), Syngenta (unremitting purveyor of one of the world's 
most-used, amphibian-poisoning pesticides), Vale S.A., (the world's 3rd largest mining company 
on the Forbes 2000 list for 2014 (http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/), unremittingly 
focused on extracting resources, despite deleterious effects on land, water, and people), E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours, Dow Chemical, BASF, and Eastman Chemical (the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 12th most 
toxic air-polluting corporations in the U.S. , respectively, based on the most recent data available 
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from the U.S. E.P.A., as compiled by the Political Economy Research Institute 
(http://www.peri.umass.edu/toxicair_current/)), and a raft of the world's largest investment 
and financial corporations eager to profit from financing these other, profitable undertakings.5   A 
number of WBCSD members feature on Global Exchange's short list of violators of human rights 
and destroyers of the environment (http://www.globalexchange.org/corporateHRviolators).  
On the 2014 list are Bayer (whose neonicotinoid pesticides may be decimating bee populations) 
and Monsanto (which owns some of the most hazardous toxic sites in the U.S.).  Alumni include 
Bank of America (for bankrolling coal production and burning), Chevron, Coca-Cola, Dow 
Chemical, the Ford Motor Company, Nestlé, Royal Dutch Shell, Suez Environment, and Syngenta 
(http://www.globalexchange.org/corporateHRviolators/alums). 
Now no person or organization may justifiably be considered morally deficient merely because 
unwittingly keeping casual company with those who are.  However, it is highly morally relevant, 
especially with regard to their predominant view of nature's value as a capital good that benefits 
people, that the IPBES fully and freely promote this view and offer it in support of the activities 
of corporations whose central goal is to profit from promoting the use of global-climate-affecting 
fossil fuels, from extracting the planet's marketable treasures when ecosystems and water sources 
must be obliterated to do this, or from producing chemicals with as few profit-reducing 
constraints as possible on toxic effluvia that poison people, among other organisms.  It is also 
highly morally relevant that the concept of "sustainable development", which features 
prominently in the IPBES charter and conceptual framework, is the "sustainable development" 
that features in the very name of the World Business Council on Sustainable Development.  
"Sustainable development" so understood glosses the behavior of many WBCSD members, which 
is arguably among the planet's most destructive with regard to the environment and human 
rights.  These facts cast serious doubt on IPBES pretensions to promote good environments and 
good human lives. 
                                                     
5 Mention should also be made of Rio Tinto, the world's 2nd largest mining company and the 14th most toxic 
air-polluting company in the U.S., and a member of the WBCSD's Water Leadership Group 
(http://www.wbcsd.org/work-program/sector-projects/water/water-leadership-group.aspx).  Rio Tinto 
collaborated with the WBCSD in utilizing the WBCSD's Corporate Ecosystem Valuation (CEV) guidelines 
(http://www.wbcsd.org/web/ecosystems/RTSummaries/Rio_Tinto_CEV_Summary.pdf), which 
sanctioned lopping down Malagasy littoral forest because it obstructed cost-effective access to the land's 
preeminent natural capital – the ilmenite that lay under root. 
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We now present a few among the many substantive errors, inconsistencies, incoherencies, and 
other deficiencies that undermine the credibility and adequacy of the IPBES framework as a 
normative framework.  Although we separate these various failings into several categories, they 
are all closely interrelated because they all stem from a single idea that is inadequate as the basis 
for normativity. 
2 Normative Concepts 
2.1  Value 
In the normative domain, there is no more basic concept than  "value".  It is vital to grasp its 
normative meaning and to grasp of how value, in this normative sense, is not just another variety 
of value in some descriptive (including economic) sense.  Without this basic awareness, little that 
is normatively credible, let alone relevant, plausible or coherent, can be said. 
Many statements in the IPBES framework evidence that this basic understanding eludes its 
authors.  This is a representative statement (MV, 3), which conveys its authors' understanding of 
"value": 
Value [sic] is a term used to describe human preferences and judgment for 
ecosystem functions and services.  Values, which are multiple and plural, may be 
formed and elicited within different cultural, social and institutional frameworks - 
all with the purpose of social and economic knowledge informing policy decisions. 
This statement concerns the actual preferences that people in fact happen to hold, and the 
judgments that they make based on these preferences.  It concerns matters of descriptive, 
empirically verifiable fact about people having certain preferences or desires and about the 
statements or "judgments" that these persons make to express these desires.  This is the sort of 
fact that psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, or economists might be able to ascertain and 
study.  However, when we can truly say that some persons have some desire, this fact does not 
reveal whether the object of this desire is worthy of being desired because it is good or has some 
kind of respect-worthy moral status.  That is, descriptive facts about actual desires have 
marginal normative importance in ascertaining whether the objects of desires have value in 
the normative sense. 
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The truth of this basic normative proposition is easy to see by reference to the many preferences 
and desires that are idle or capricious, alongside others that are maladaptive, perverse, or even 
vile – that is, not worthy of satisfaction – sometimes even by the lights of the person whose 
desires they are.  Were we to forget this truth, it would be a great mystery that marketing 
campaigns don't generally increase the world's goodness by encouraging people to desire more 
things.  The truth of this proposition is also evident from its indispensible role in explaining why 
we can truly maintain that slavery was not good, even though for millennia, it was desired and 
valued by slaveholders, and furthermore was the norm (in the descriptive sense) for these slave-
holding societies.  Nor, provided that we keep this truth in mind, need we condone the 
persecution and execution of many Jews by Nazis, even though these horrendous acts embodied 
a cultural norm for Nazis who regarded Semites as outside human norms.  These examples show 
that the fact that a culture as a whole embodies some set of values (in the descriptive sense) does 
not make those values worthy of holding or endorsing.  Finally, if things were centrally good 
merely because persons actually desired or valued them, then these persons couldn't have 
important reasons to have the desires that they have – other than desiring to have those desires. 
2.2 The different meanings of "value" 
When the IPBES attempt to categorize values, they correctly observe (Díaz et al. 2015b, 11), "A 
necessary first step is to distinguish between different uses of the term 'value'."  But they are 
unaware that "what some person desires or values" is a fact about a person's mental state, not a 
fact about whether (or not) the object of that desire is good or worthy of being valued.  These are 
not merely two different categories of value.  Rather, these are two entirely different subjects.  
Only the latter, normative subject is relevant; it cannot be coherently discussed when conflated 
with discussion about psychological states.  Although the term "intrinsic value" is multiply 
ambiguous and causes much mischief when these meanings are conflated, all of its meanings 
relate to value in the central, normative sense.  Something with intrinsic value in any of its senses, 
is something that commands some kind of moral respect, which structures what is permissible, 
impermissible, and obligatory for people to do with regard to that thing.  The fact that Rio Tinto 
(in the person of its CEO and stockholders) harbored (and satisfied) a desire to lop down 
Malagasy forest has no such normative force; in fact, many would say that this action was 
impermissible and deserves condemnation.  Nor, most would say, does the desire of Vale S.A. (a 
WBCSD member) to "sustainably develop" the ferric riches of the Serra do Gandarela with an 
The IPBES Conceptual Framework/Maier & Feest 8 
open pit mine, when this would intrude on a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve and jeopardize a 
critical source of water. 
The IPBES definition of the category of "relational values" reflects this same confusion and adds 
another.  The authors first correctly observe that "economic values… reflect the extent to which 
they confer satisfaction" – that is, to the extent to which they satisfy human preferences and 
desires.6  They add, "Relational values, on the other hand, are imbedded in desirable (sought after) 
relationships…"  [italics added]  In this telling statement, the authors insert the parenthetical 
phrase "sought after" to ensure that the reader interprets the word "desirable", which may 
sometimes mean "worthy of desire", to in this context mean "what is actually desired".  This 
explanation occurs in the broader context of what these authors take to be "a good quality of life".  
[italics in the original]  But it is hard to muster any credible argument for the proposition that a 
good life centrally consists in satisfying desires, without taking into account what these desires 
are desires for.  The added confusion is that, contrary to what these authors imply with a distinct 
category of relational desires, all desires are relational because they form a relation between a 
desiring subject and that subject's object of desire.  That is, the category of relational is the 
category of all desires or values actually held, and therefore serves, no categorizing purpose – 
even for categorizing these psychological states. 
2.3 Economic value 
This basic confusion is further manifested in the dominant role that the authors give to 
economic values in the IPBES framework.  It is uncertain whether its authors are aware of just 
how dominant it is.  When they mention (Díaz et al. 2015b, 11) existence value, bequest value, 
and option value, they do not indicate that these are categories of economic value, even though 
they do not involve the immediate consumption of the valued object.7  The term "ecosystem 
services" is ensconced in the organization's very name.  Indeed, the authors do not stray outside 
the narrow economic confines that the econometric term "service" suggests.  According to these 
authors, goods are either "assets" or "services" (see, for example the Glossary in Díaz et al. 2015b, 
12-13).  An asset, in their economic language is something owned that's expected to provide 
                                                     
6 Economic values are further discussed just below in the main text. 
7 We offer a few observations about these specific kinds of economic value later in this section. 
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benefits.  By the authors' lights, knowledge is "an anthropogenic asset".  When some part of 
nature is important to the identity of a group of persons, the authors consider its value to consist 
in offering a "cultural service" (Díaz et al. 2015b, 11). 
These econometric characterizations are narrow to the point of being grossly distorting, and (as 
we shall see shortly), have marginal normative importance.  They do not come close to conveying 
the richness of the good of knowledge or its pursuit.  The knowledge that some biologist acquires 
from dedicated study of slime moulds is good and his pursuit of this knowledge is admirable 
even if no benefit ever is realized from it.  To view this knowledge as "property" is to 
fundamentally misconceive what makes it and its pursuit good.  In a similar way, an icon that is 
central to practice of a respectable culture may help to solidify the identity and of persons who 
embrace it, and may help to structure their life in positive ways.  To regard this icon as a service-
rendering prop is to misconceive the good of a good human identity.  The goods of knowledge 
and positive cultural identity are largely or entirely inaccessible from an econometric standpoint. 
The source of these misconstruals is, once again, the result of conflating economic valuations, 
which often have marginal normative relevance, with normatively important considerations.  A 
thing – either an asset or a service – is economically valuable when some persons, in fact, desire 
or value it and express this desire by entering into some transaction for it in a real or imaginary 
market.8  This transaction reflects their willingness to pay for the thing.  Less often observed is 
that this also reflects their ability to pay for it.  Economic value, by definition, most strongly 
reflects the desires of the rich.  This fact is cause for moral concern with real-world implications 
when, for example, the rich are Dow Chemical (the WBCSD member whose pursuit of 
sustainable development makes it the 3rd largest U.S. air-polluter) and the poor are the 
impoverished survivors of Bhopal. 
More fundamentally concerning is the fact that economic reckoning, by design, takes no account 
whatever of why any person, whether rich or poor, desires a thing.  In other words, economic 
valuations, when interpreted normatively as do the IPBES, formalize the fundamental normative 
error of conflating actual desires with desires that are worthy of satisfaction.  That this is an error 
                                                     
8 Economists are not reluctant to invent and imagine markets for the purpose of economic valuation when 
none actually exist – through such constructs as contingent evaluation, hedonic pricing, and "shadow" 
pricing. 
The IPBES Conceptual Framework/Maier & Feest 10 
is again easy to see.  In Nazi Germany, Hermann Göring sponsored and promoted the Heck 
brothers' project of recreating some semblance of the extinct Auroch.  He saw this creature as a 
symbol of mythic cultural identity embodied in the Nibelungenlied (Wang 2012) 9.  While we may 
say without qualification that these Heck cattle offered a cultural service, few would say that this 
back-bred-into-existence creature, the breeding program that created it, or the identity that it 
sought to embody were good.  Of course no one believes that the authors of the IPBES framework 
are Nazis.  However, neither should anyone believe that the IPBES have a respectable framework 
for their project when we see that it shares essential elements of its justification with morally 
repugnant Nazi projects. 
It is important to observe that existence value and option value are no different from other 
categories of economic value in their normative unimportance.  The existence value of some thing 
manifests the psychological fact that some persons may desire or value that that thing come to 
exist or continue to exist.  Of such a desire, like any other, we can and should ask, is this desire 
one that we have reason to think worthy of satisfaction?  Many would question the worthiness of 
desires behind the existence value of surrogate aurochs in Białowieża or of open pit mines in 
Serra do Gandarela. 
Many who appeal to the option value of some thing understand "option value" informally, as the 
mere possibility that this thing might somehow, sometime, be handy to have in the future.  
Unfortunately, option value, so understood, appears to exclude nothing.  Essentially everything 
qualifies, including the world's rubbish.  Those who routinely act on the principle that some 
thing with option value, so understood, should be set aside are said to suffer from hoarding 
disorder.  On the other hand, neoclassical economics much more stringently defines option value 
as the premium – over and above the expected net benefit, which benefit is (again) over and 
above the thing's cost – that people are (as a matter of psychological fact) willing to pay, up front, 
merely to retain the option of consuming it sometime later rather than immediately.  It is 
doubtful that nature or even any part of nature passes this test and the authors of the IPBES say 
nothing to dispel this doubt.  Indeed, they evidence no awareness of the need to do so. 
                                                     
9 Part of this restoration project involved evicting non-Aryans from Białowieża, the Polish wood that 
Göring envisaged as the proper home of the surrogate Aurochs.  According to Wang (2012), "The Polish 
biologist Tadeusz Vetulani described this dual program – of human extermination and animal propagation 
– as the German 'management' of Białowieża." 
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2.4 Stakeholders 
The authors of the IPBES framework liberally sprinkle the term "stakeholder" throughout their 
discussion (Díaz et al. 2015a, 1, 2, 3, 5; Díaz et al. 2015b, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12) and repeatedly 
assert their desire to include as many as possible.  To understand the normative relevance of this 
policy requires understanding that a stakeholder in the IPBES is simply some party that, as a 
matter of psychological fact, has an interest in what the IPBES say and do. 
Unfortunately, the IPBES do not evidence awareness of the fact that the inclusion of stakeholders 
leaves open the crucial normative question of which parties have stakes, interests, or desires that 
are worthy of inclusion.  This unawareness is another way in which the framework authors 
conflate actual desires – in this case, the actual desires held by stakeholders – with desires worthy 
of being satisfied. 
This error does not have merely theoretical interest to moral philosophers.  The most powerful 
stakeholders – for example, the WBCSD, which amalgamates wealth and power of the 
individually wealthiest and most powerful parties in the world – may well have stakes of 
questionable worth.  In the absence of a credible normative theory, the questionable worthiness 
of these interests does not diminish the degree to which these interests may be represented in 
IPBES proceedings.  On the contrary, these interests are likely to be represented in proportion to 
the wealth and power of the parties whose interests they are – that is, overwhelming most others.  
We need only examine the environmental record and the record on human rights of these 
corporations, which routinely tread with impunity on the environment and relatively powerless 
people. 
2.5 Western Science versus "Indigenous and Local Knowledge" 
The IPBES framework juxtaposes (Díaz et al. 2015b, 4) "what [they]… call western science on the 
one hand and other knowledge systems, in particular indigenous and local knowledge (ILK), on 
the other."  The normatively important part of this juxtaposition yet again conflates description 
with prescription. 
"Western science" is concerned to discover facts about things in the spatio-temporal world, as 
well as their descriptive, non-normative properties and relationships.  These are not facts about 
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the goodness of certain things, why those things matter, and what we ought to do in a world 
where these things matter in the ways that they do.  In contrast, some part of the "indigenous and 
local knowledge" to which the IPBES authors refer, consists of a body of beliefs about why certain 
things do matter and what that entails for how people ought to behave with respect to these 
things. 
It is a category mistake to think that one can usefully or even coherently compare, let alone 
reconcile, some scientific fact, for example, about how wolves regulate the population of elk in 
some ecosystem with some normative claim about whether or not some proportion of wolves to 
elk is good.  This is why it literally makes no sense to propose (Díaz et al. 2015b, 10) to leverage 
Multiple Evidence Based techniques to address differences between western scientific 
knowledge and the normative views of others.  In a similar way, IPBES framework's multiple 
statements about finding "commonalities" and "common ground" (Díaz et al. 2015a, 1, 4, 5; Díaz 
et al. 2015b, 4, 7, 8) in values make no more (nor less) sense than finding the commonalities 
between helping a friend in need and the color of that friend's hair. 
2.6 Economic measures 
Substituting "economic fact" for "scientific fact" – as the IPBES authors frequently do by reference 
to "benefits to people" as evaluated and indexed by neoclassical or happiness economics (Díaz et 
al. 2015b, 7) – repeats, rather than corrects, the error that yields this incoherence.  Among the 
indexes they mention, the GDP summarizes facts about the market transactions that people have, 
in fact, entered into in pursuit of satisfying their desires.  And happiness indexes summarize 
other psychological facts about how people report a certain aspect of their psychological state.  Of 
course, no one has a credible theory of what happiness is, let along whether it is something that 
can be measured or compared between persons.   There is no plausible account of what to make 
of the fact that two persons in essentially identical circumstances might register significantly 
different happiness scores.  Apparently, some people are simply more efficient happiness 
transducers than others.  But this fact teaches us nothing about what is good.  Meanwhile, Bhutan 
has leveraged its happiness index to try to dispel questions regarding policies that others find 
questionable on substantive normative grounds. 
It is particularly easy to illustrate the extent to which a measure of economic value such as the 
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GDP is indifferent to the good of nature, with its biodiversity.10  Attempts to clear the 119 
million tonnes of crude oil spilled in 1967 in the wreck of the Torrey Canyon may have raised 
the UK's GDP.  This economic boon was due, in part, from the production and application of 
dispersants and detergents, which greatly increased the scope of the pollution.  This boost in 
economic value had no commensurate economic cost to nature or its biodiversity, though it killed 
some 15,000 birds, many seals, and countless unrecorded other creatures and organisms.  The 
economic cost – to fishers, tourist-oriented businesses, and the like – was relatively small.  And 
the economic cost that some economists like to compute from imaginary markets – in foul smells 
and displeasing sights – was essentially invisible next to the economic boon.  The case of the 
Torrey Canyon is not exceptional.  According to J.P. Morgan Chase's U.S. chief economist in 2010 
(di Leo, 2010), "The [BP Gulf oil] spill clearly implies a lot of economic hardship in some 
locations, but given what we know today, the magnitude of these setbacks looks dwarfed by the 
scale of the US macroeconomy."  Estimates of 4,000 unemployed people hired for the cleanup 
efforts, which some reports have said could be worth between $3 and $6 billion "would likely 
mean a near-to medium-term boost to activity that might offset the drags."  More recently, Kinder 
Morgan's report to the Canadian National Energy Board on their proposed Trans Mountain 
Project pipeline candidly stated (Kinder Morgan, 2014), "Pipeline spills can have both positive 
and negative effects on local and regional economies, both in the short- and long-ter… Spill 
response and cleanup creates business and employment opportunities for affected communities, 
regions, and cleanup service providers." 
The case of the Torrey Canyon and other, similar ones illustrate something quite general and 
quite important about how economic values may not reflect what really matters.  One more 
example may help to bring home this point.  Sometime around 2000, Philip Morris commissioned 
Arthur D. Little International to do a cost-benefit analysis of smoking on the Czech national 
finances.  Released late in 2000, the report's 
… principal finding is that the negative financial effects of smoking (such as 
                                                     
10 We realize that some number of economists have also expressed discomfort with the GDP on the 
grounds that it does not adequately represent human welfare.  However, for two reasons, this does not 
affect the points we make about the GDP:  1) It is the most straightforward embodiment of economic value; 
and 2) substitutes for GDP, including for example, happiness indexes, are equally deficient and for similar 
reasons. 
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increased health care costs) are more than offset by positive effects (such as excise 
tax and VAT collected on tobacco products).  This conclusion would hold even if 
the indirect positive effects of smoking were neglected…  Among the positive 
effects, excise tax, VAT and health care cost savings due to early mortality are the most 
important. [italics added] (Arthur D. Little International, 2000, 1-2) 
That cigarettes kill people may be an economic good.  This should make it less surprising 
that oil spills, too, may boost the economy.  Most importantly, these facts about economic 
values should make it clear that "good economically" should not be taken to mean "good" 
in any central normative sense. 
2.7 Value conflicts 
The authors barely acknowledge the possibility of value conflict; the word "conflict" appears but 
once in the two papers (Díaz et al. 2015b, 12), and only in passing.  The credibility of a normative 
framework barely acknowledges the fact that norms may conflict may be called into serious 
question on this account. 
It is important to see how this deficiency stems from a common root with others already 
discussed.  The mistaken belief that economic valuations – measures of market-based desires and 
preferences – are normatively important straightforwardly suggests the corollary belief that all 
held values – even those that appear to conflict – are ultimately subject to market arbitration.  The 
market can determine how to most efficiently allocate resources so as to realize a Pareto 
resolution of economic benefits to economic costs for all.  This market magic appears to make 
conflicts disappear by weighing all goods and bads on a single scale, which can tell us 
whether or not they add up to the greatest good for all.  Except, this scale necessarily includes 
many economic goods that are of questionable normative relevance, while omitting what may be 
the normatively most important values of all, as the previous section suggests. 
Not content with this magic, the authors make brief reference to another, more recent form of 
magic – Multiple Evidence Based Techniques (MEB).  But no magic can resolve conflicts between 
the normative beliefs of those who are not scientists with the non-normative beliefs of western 
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scientists – because these beliefs concern facts in different domains.11  This methodology also 
relies on the mistaken notion, discussed above, that normatively correct, or at least more credible, 
decisions may be reached by including more stakeholders.  But it is mistaken to believe that any 
decision is normatively correct by virtue of the methodology employed in reaching it.  No matter 
the decision process, we may always ask of the decision it reaches, "Is it right?" 
Neither economics, nor markets, nor the latest fads in decision procedures provide a "Rosetta 
Stone" for values, understood in the central normative sense. 
2.8 Success 
The IBPES framework repeatedly refers to "solutions" (Díaz et al. 2015a, 1, 2, 5, 6; Díaz et al. 
2015b, 11, 12) to "problems" (Díaz et al. 2015a, 2, 5, 6); Díaz et al. 2015b, 9, 10, 12).  Unfortunately, 
its authors neglect to characterize what problems these "solutions" are solutions for.  This 
neglect points to another normative deficiency.  No circumstance can be understood as a 
"problem" and no action can be understood as a "solution" without reference to some (non-
descriptive) norm that distinguishes problematic states of affairs from non-problematic ones, and 
some other, though related, norm for what "success" (Díaz et al. 2015a, 5) in addressing it would 
consist in.  The IPBES conceptual framework does not provide any clue for what those norms 
might be, let alone how any such norms might be justified, or how norms for conflicting views of 
success might be reconciled. 
2.9 A Good Life 
The phrase "a good life" appears a half-dozen times in Díaz et al. 2015b.  From this fact one might 
surmise that the authors of the IPBES conceptual framework incorporate into their framework 
some well-considered theory of what constitutes a good human life.  Some very great thinkers 
have pondered this question; they have sought to elaborate some theory that provides a plausible 
answer.  Aristotle thought that living well has to do with excellence in exercising the rational soul 
                                                     
11 Making this point simply requires glossing over the fact that a normative fact may supervene on non-
normative ones:  The normative fact that I really ought to quickly turn my car's steering wheel  may 
supervene on the non-normative fact that a child has dashed into my path.  But the complexities of this 
supervenience relationship does not undermine the simple fact that my obligation to swerve is not 
contained in mere descriptions of the physics and biology of the situation. 
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in accordance with the virtues.  Kant thought that living well has to do with living in accord with 
the moral law, which we can rationally legislate for ourselves.  
Frequent appearances of the phrase "a good life" notwithstanding, the IPBES framers offer no 
comparable, or even minimally credible theory of "the good life".  Instead, the framework 
routinely slides from the phrase "a good life", to the italicized phrase "a good quality of life" or 
"human well-being".  In a few passages, the authors gesture towards some suitably broader 
understanding of what a "good quality of life" consists in.  At one point, they mention (but only 
mention) the ideals of "justice, freedom, and equality" (Díaz et al. 2015b, 6).  And they 
acknowledge the importance of certain basic requirements of human existence, such as water; as 
well as other requirements for exercising important human capacities (Díaz et al. 2015b, 6). 
Whatever faint ray of hope that these isolated thoughts might be developed and incorporated 
into a more credible framework is quickly quashed.  Immediately after their mention, the authors 
reiterate their view that these and other aspects of a good quality of life are the kind of goods – 
benefits to people – that may be measured by the GDP, the wealth index, and happiness indexes.  
In other words, the framework presents no conception of the good that departs from the 
economic good of possessing and benefiting from assets and services or from self-reporting about 
being happy about them. 
The extent to which the framework revolves around this untenable normative view is difficult to 
exaggerate but plain to see from how thoroughly econometric language suffuses the framework.  
The word "service" is baked into the name of the organization.  Some thing that is culturally 
important renders a cultural service and, of course, ecosystems are valuable for services rendered 
in the human economy.  Knowledge is an asset, a characterization that suits any benefit-rendering 
possession.  Of course, knowledge is an anthropogenic asset, in contrast to nature, which supplies 
non-anthropogenic assets and services. 
The title of Díaz et al. 2015a indicates that the IPBES conceptual framework is a Rosetta Stone, 
not for nature's value, but rather for "natures benefits to people".  In Díaz et al. 2015b (9), the 
IPBES framework authors forthrightly indicate that they do not address normatively relevant 
facts (which they call "linkages") "when they by-pass nature's benefits to people." [italics in the 
original]  Unsurprisingly, this statement appears in a section that bears the title "Values and 
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valuation of nature and its benefits to people" [italics added], lest we forget the authors' main focus.  
All told, the phrase "benefits to people" occurs almost three dozen times between Díaz et al. 2015a 
and Díaz et al. 2015b.  Now some sophisticated thinkers, such as Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart 
Mill, and Peter Singer, have defended the utilitarian view that normative value is saliently 
determined by counting benefits and weighing costs.  But it is doubtful that any of them would 
defend the view that these benefits and costs correspond to market-expressed satisfaction of 
desires, which preoccupies the economics of assets and services. 
The authors declare (Díaz et al. 2015b, 4), "every effort was made during the development of the 
Díaz et al. 2015b to represent… alternative views."  It is difficult to take this declaration 
seriously, when their starting point and constant frame of reference is the normative view that 
nothing is good that does not benefit people in the narrow and normatively questionable 
sense that economic indexes measure. 
3 Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services, and the Goodness of Nature 
We are discussing the conceptual framework for the Intergovernmental Panel on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services.  It is therefore important to step back and say a few things about both 
biodiversity and ecosystem services, and particularly about how these things relate to what we 
imagine really matters to many, if not almost all, biologists.  
What really matters to these scientists?  What motivates them to endure their demanding training 
and arduous work – often involving extremely difficult conditions in the field and endless 
tedium in the lab?  Why do they do all this for modest compensation?  How do their answers 
relate to biodiversity and ecosystem services? 
We will address these questions shortly – but only after making a few relevant observations 
about what the IPBES scientists say about biodiversity.  In truth, most revealing is what they 
don't say.  One might suppose that having a conceptual framework that substantively addresses 
the goodness of biodiversity would require some elaboration of what this thing is, which is 
supposed to be good.  For how else could we possibly understand how and why it is good?  
Instead, we find nothing on this score in Díaz et al. 2015a, and sequestered away in the glossary 
of Díaz et al. 2015b, only the standard, perfunctory, Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
definition in the glossary:  "The variability among living organisms…"  But the view that 
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variability is the key to biodiversity's goodness is not at all plausible.  It invites such wise-guy 
suggestions as ones to increase world's biological goodness by setting genetic engineers to work 
and by disturbing as many habitats as possible to jump-start adaptive evolutionary processes. 
The absence of serious attention to the normatively crucial step of characterizing biodiversity 
seems mysterious until one notices a similar absence in the literature of the WBCSD.  The 
WBCSD's key documents on biodiversity – "Effective Biodiversity and Ecosystem Policy and 
Regulation" and " Guide to Corporate Ecosystem Evaluation" – offer the same, inadequate 
account of biodiversity.  These documents refer the reader to those of the Business and 
Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), principally their "Biodiversity Offset Cost-Benefit 
Handbook".  The definition of "biodiversity in that last document is only to be found in a 
separate, "Glossary" document.  It recites the same, perfunctory, and inadequate CBD definition 
found in the IPBES conceptual framework.  Yet some progress towards a more perceptive 
understanding of biodiversity has been made whereby it is viewed as a quality relating to a 
taxonomic unit (or gene pool or ecosystem) described by a number of characteristics that can be 
measured (as for example, described by Feest et al. 2010). 
The key to the mysterious absence of some sound basis for understanding biodiversity (either 
descriptively or normatively) is that, for the purposes of the WBCSD and BBOP, none is needed.  
The documents just mentioned discuss "sustainable development" in which biodiversity is 
discussed almost entirely by way of describing the practice and methodology of "biodiversity 
offsets".  The good of nature or biodiversity does not enter into this discussion, as one may see by 
reference to the BBOP's "Biodiversity Offset Cost-Benefit Handbook" and the WBSCD's "Guide to 
Corporate Ecosystem Valuation".  The main focus of the methodology is how best to convince 
locals to accept compensation for whatever these people regard as lost as a consequence of 
environmentally destructive development projects.  This, then, is the core of "sustainable 
development".  Because the IPBES framework relies on similar principles, which are 
substantively also those of the WBSCD and BBOP, it similarly has no need for trying to figure out 
why biodiversity really matters. 
Let us now get back to our questions for biologists.  In our experience, when it comes to 
biodiversity, it is difficult to find any biologist who responds to those questions along these lines:   
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I'm in this to make sure that when Rio Tinto lops down a Malagasy forest, they 
follow WBCSD and BBOP guidelines for biodiversity offsets.  This, you know, is 
sustainable development, which is central to properly valuing nature and 
biodiversity.  I cannot think of anything more worthwhile for a biologist to 
dedicate her career to. 
Yet this is the response that one should expect from someone who honestly endorses the 
IPBES conceptual framework. 
Rather, the biologist's answer tends to be more along these very different lines: 
I am utterly and unalterably fascinated by slime moulds (or frogs, or trees, or 
whales, or…).  It is truly difficult for me to imagine any undertaking that would be 
more fulfilling or give my life greater meaning, than devoting it to an effort to 
better understand these organisms' way of life.  In the end, I think that this might 
help us humans better understand ourselves as human and as related to other 
creatures and organisms in our world. 
As for ecosystem services, we have found few biologists who, in moments of candor, reflect the 
precepts of the IPBES framework by saying: 
You know, I really think that we should make sure that all organisms do the jobs 
that we depend on them to do.  All of them should be expected to pull their own 
weight in the economy.  The great joy and value of biology, for me, is arranging 
ecosystems for the efficient economic performance of their inhabitants.  Of course, 
the fate of organisms that contribute little, nothing, or just get in the way of 
economic development should not preoccupy us.  The same goes for ecosystems, 
which despite our best efforts to rearrange and manage them for efficient 
rendering of services, fail the economic test.  Better for all that we develop them 
into something more economically valuable. 
Those, who like the IPBES framework authors and the members of the WBCSD and BBOP, 
sincerely espouse the view that nature's value is centrally due to services rendered, commit 
themselves to this view of their work.  The corporate parties evidence full awareness of this.  We 
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are uncertain that scientists have a similar awareness. 
4 Conclusion 
Our conclusion regarding the IPBES conceptual framework is cause for alarm at the 
orientation it establishes for the IPBES.  Conserving nature and its biodiversity involves 
understanding what is good about these things.  Without this understanding, we cannot hope to 
know how to act so as to ensure a place for these good things in our world. 
One cannot ensure a place for the civic good of freely casting votes without understanding that 
this good very essentially relates to the good of citizens jointly determining their shared destiny 
in the world.  To realize this good, one must understand that, while a market in votes would be 
an economic boon and would efficiently get votes to those who most value, and can pay for, 
them, this economic regime would not properly value voting.  To the contrary, it would corrupt 
civic virtues and values central to self-governance. 
In a similar way, for all the reasons we have offered in this paper alongside others offered 
elsewhere12, it is highly doubtful that an econometric understanding of nature and biodiversity, 
which suffuses the IPBES conceptual framework, properly captures the goodness of these things.  
Alarm enters when one realizes that acting on this terribly mistaken conception of what really 
matters about them already has, and will likely continue, to wreak havoc on nature and 
biodiversity, insofar as these things really do matter. 
In their conceptual framework, the IPBES reveal that they understand "biodiversity" centrally in 
the econometric terms of the WBCSD and BBOP.  Dominating their economic evaluation of 
biodiversity is the notion of a biodiversity offset, a centerpiece in their conception of "sustainable 
development".  A biodiversity offset, in turn, is principally understood (BBOP, 2010) in terms 
of the world's wealthiest and most powerful corporations offering compensation to 
"stakeholders" who are typically among the worlds' poorest and powerless, for the costs that 
they incur as a result of poisoning or ripping apart the place where they live.  This is a recipe 
for environmental devastation. 
For all these reasons, we urge the IPBES to back away from its false start and to withdraw their 
                                                     
12 See, for example, Maier, 2012 – particularly §6.3 and Chapter 8. 
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imprimatur from a program that is, in substance, borrowed from the WBCSD.  We urge that 
IPBES start afresh by redoubling their effort to understand what really matters about nature 
and biodiversity.  We realize how difficult this may be.  However, by staying in touch with the 
reasons that made them devote their life to biology, they may this time find something that 
rings true. 
  
The IPBES Conceptual Framework/Maier & Feest 22 
 
References 
Arthur D. Little International. 2000. Public Finance Balance of Smoking in the Czech Republic. 
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/content/what_we_do/industry_watch/philip_morris_czech/
pmczechstudy.pdf. 
Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP). 2009. Biodiversity Offset Cost-Benefit 
Handbook. http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_3094.pdf. 
Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP). 2012. Glossary. http://www.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/doc_3100.pdf 
Di Leo, L. 2010. Oil Spill May End Up Lifting GDP Slightly. The Wall Street Jounal. June 15, 2010. 
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2010/06/15/oil-spill-may-end-up-lifting-gdp-slightly/ 
Díaz S., Demissew, S., Joly, C., Lonsdale, W.M., and Larigauderie, A. 2015a. A Rosetta Stone for 
Nature’s Benefits to People. PLoS Biol 13(1): e1002040. doi: 10.1371/journal.pbio.1002040. 
http://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.1002040.  Referenced in 
the text as 'Díaz et al. 2015a'. 
Díaz, S. et al. 2015b. The IPBES Conceptual Framework – connecting nature and people. Current 
Opinion in Environmental Sustainability. 14:1-16. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S187734351400116X.  Referenced in the text 
as 'Díaz et al. 2015b'. 
Feest, A., Aldred, T. D., and Jedamzik, K. 2010. Biodiversity quality: A paradigm for biodiversity. 
Ecological Indicators 10(6): 1077-1082. 
IPBES. 2015. Preliminary guide regarding diverse conceptualization of multiple values of nature 
and its benefits, including biodiversity and ecosystem functions and services. 
http://www.ipbes.net/images/documents/WP/comments/20150226/FOR_REVIEW_IPBES_3_
INF_7.pdf.  Referenced in the text as 'MV'. 
Kinder Morgan. 2013. Trans Mountain Project Expansion (Report to the National Energy Board). 
The IPBES Conceptual Framework/Maier & Feest 23 
Volume 8A: 615. https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-
eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90464/90552/548311/956726/2392873/2451003/2393783/B18-33_-
_V8A_5.5.2_F5.5.2_TO_5.6.2.2_MAR_TRANS_ASSESS_-
_A3S5Q3.pdf?nodeid=2393564&vernum=-2 
Maier, D.S. 2012.  What's So Good About Biodiversity? A Call for Better Reasoning About Nature's 
Value.  Dordrecht: Springer. 
Wang, M. 2012. Heavy Breeding: The Heck "Aurochs" and the quest for biological unity. Cabinet. 
Issue 45. http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/45/wang.php. 
World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD). 2010. Effective Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Policy and Regulation. 
http://www.wbcsd.org/Pages/EDocument/EDocumentDetails.aspx?ID=21. 
World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD). 2011. Guide to Corporate 
Ecosystem Valuation (CEV). 
http://www.wbcsd.org/pages/edocument/edocumentdetails.aspx?id=104. 
 
